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This paper analyses the effect immigration has on wages of native workers. 
Unlike most previous work, we estimate wage effects along the distribution of 
wages. We derive a flexible empirical strategy that does not rely on pre-allocating 
immigrants to particular skill groups. In our empirical analysis, we demonstrate that 
immigrants downgrade considerably upon arrival. As for the effects on native wages, 
we find that immigration depresses wages below the 20th percentile of the wage 
distribution, but leads to slight wage increases in the upper part of the wage 
distribution. The overall wage effect of immigration is slightly positive. The positive 
wage effects we find are, although modest, too large to be explained by an 
immigration surplus. We suggest alternative explanations, based on the idea that 
immigrants are paid less than the value of what they contribute to production, 
generating therefore a surplus, and we assess the magnitude of these effects. 
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Abstract:  This  paper  analyses  the  effect  immigration  has  on  wages  of 
native workers. Unlike most previous work, we estimate wage effects along the 
distribution of wages. We derive a flexible empirical strategy that does not rely on 
pre-allocating immigrants to particular skill groups. In our empirical analysis, we 
demonstrate  that  immigrants  downgrade  considerably  upon  arrival.  As  for  the 
effects on native wages, we find that immigration depresses wages below the 20
th 
percentile of the wage distribution, but leads to slight wage increases in the upper 
part of the wage distribution. The overall wage effect of immigration is slightly 
positive. The positive wage effects we find are, although modest, too large to be 
explained by an immigration surplus. We suggest alternative explanations, based 
on the idea that immigrants are paid less than the value of what they contribute to 
production, generating therefore a surplus, and we assess the magnitude of these 
effects. 
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This paper analyses the effect of immigration on the wages of native born 
workers. Our analysis is for the UK, which experienced an increase of its foreign 
born population equal to three percent of the native population over the period 
between  1997  and  2005.  We  focus  on  the  effect  of  immigration  on  wages  of 
native born workers along the native wage distribution. Importantly, the estimator 
we develop does not rely on pre-allocation of immigrants to skill categories. Our 
estimation strategy is motivated by two observations. First, we believe that the 
distributional effect of immigration on wages is a matter of considerable policy 
interest. Secondly, we believe that estimation of relative wage effects across skill 
groups is problematic, at least in the case of the UK, as immigrants considerably 
downgrade after arrival, and pre-allocation to skill groups may therefore lead to 
considerable misclassification error.  
Our paper adds to the current literature on immigration in various ways. 
First,  we  propose  a  simple  estimation  method  that  allows  assessing  the  effect 
immigration has on native workers at each point in the native wage distribution, 
without pre-assigning immigrants to particular skill groups. Secondly, we provide 
a clear theory-based interpretation to the estimated parameter, and show that it is 
exactly  proportional  to  the  density  of  immigrants  along  the  native  wage 
distribution.  Our  analysis  gives  a  fresh  interpretation  to  the  latest  work  by 
Manacorda,  Manning  and  Wadsworth  (2006)  for  the  UK,  suggesting  that  the 
incomplete substitutability of immigrants and natives within age and education 
cells they find is much related to a substantial downgrading of immigrants on 
arrival.
2 Finally, we address the overall positive wage effect that we find, and we 
propose, and assess, alternative explanations for these. 
We commence with a general theoretical discussion. First, we note that the 
common notion that immigration depresses average wages of native workers is 
                                                 
2 See Ottaviano and Peri (2005, 2006) for a similar argument for the US, and Borjas, Grogger and 
Hanson (2008) for a critical re-assessment.     3 
based  on  a  simple  one industry  model,  where  capital  is  fixed.
3  We  develop  a 
model with not just two, but many skill types and capital as factors of production. 
We show that, whenever the immigrant skill composition differs from that of the 
native labour force, and if capital is elastic in supply, the effect on average wages 
of  native  workers  should  be  zero  or  even  slightly  positive.  This  result  is 
unsurprising as it is based on a simple surplus argument, but has, in our view, not 
received sufficient attention in the literature on the effects of immigration, where 
capital supply is usually assumed as being fixed, so that the surplus goes mainly 
to capital owners.  
Although the overall wage effect of immigration may therefore be close to 
zero,  the  effects  of  immigration  should  be  differently  felt  along  the  wage 
distribution, possibly depressing wages of workers who are in segments of the 
labour  market  where  the  density  of  immigrants  is  higher  than  that  of  native 
workers.  This  calls  for  an  empirical  approach  that  investigates  the  impact  of 
immigration along the wage distribution. Earlier papers do distinguish between 
wage effects on skilled and unskilled workers (see e.g. Altonji and Card 1991, 
Borjas 2003, Card 2001, Dustmann et al. 2005, Friedberg 2001 and Jaeger 2007a), 
and/or analyse the effect of immigration on relative wages (see e.g. Card 2005, 
2007, Card and Lewis 2007, Manacorda et al. 2006, Ottaviano and Peri 2006, 
Glitz  2006).  These  approaches  require  pre-allocation  of  immigrants  to  skill 
groups, based on their observable characteristics.
4 We demonstrate for the case of 
the  UK  that  immigrants  downgrade  upon  arrival,  and  that  pre-allocation  of 
immigrants  according  to  their  measured  skills  would  place  them  at  different 
locations across the native wage distribution than where we actually find them. 
This is particularly problematic when estimation is based on differences between 
time periods defined  as  years rather than decades, as only  recent  arrivals will 
affect estimates. 
We  suggest  a  strategy  that  circumvents  this  problem.  Based  on  our 
theoretical framework, where we allow for many different skill types, we derive 
an estimable model where we allocate immigrants to skill groups according to 
                                                 
3  See  Ottaviano  and  Peri  (2006)  and  Lewis  (2005)  for  a  similar  critical  assessment  of  this 
assumption. 
4 Card (2008) defines skill  groups according to the quartile of the  wage distribution  where a 
worker would be predicted to be located. This is similar in spirit to our approach.     4 
their observed position in the native wage distribution rather than pre-allocating 
them to skill groups according to their observed characteristics. We then estimate 
wage effects of immigration across the distribution of native wages. With our 
approach no ex-ante restriction is imposed on where immigrants compete with 
natives.  
Our empirical investigation first demonstrates that immigrants to the UK 
over the period we consider are on average much better educated than natives. But 
while perfect substitutability of immigrants with natives within measured age-skill 
groups would imply that immigrants are located at the upper and middle part of 
the wage distribution, their observed location after arrival is at the lower end of 
this  distribution.  Our  estimated  wage  effects  along  the  wage  distribution  are 
strikingly in line with the location of immigrants: while immigration depresses 
wages  below  the  20
th  percentile,  it  contributes  to  wage  growth  above  the  20
th 
percentile.  
We  also  find  that  the  average  effects  of  immigration  on  wages  are 
positive.  Although  this  is  in  principle  possible  within  a  model  where  capital 
supply is elastic, simulations of our model, based on the actual distribution of 
immigrants across the wage distribution, suggest that the average wage effects we 
find,  although  relatively  modest,  are  too  large  to  be  explained  by  a  surplus 
argument.  In  the  last  section  of  the  paper,  we  discuss  a  number  of  possible 
mechanisms  that  may  explain  our  estimates.  The  underlying  idea  of  all 
explanations  is  that  immigrants  are  paid  less  than  the  value  of  what  they 
contribute  to  production,  generating  therefore  a  surplus.  We  then  assess 
empirically the magnitude of this surplus for our data. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we explain our 
theoretical  framework,  and  discuss  our  estimation  strategy.  In  section  3  we 
present the datasets we use in the analysis and describe the main features of the 
immigrant  population.  Section  4  presents  the  results.  Section  5  discusses 
mechanisms of surplus generation and presents some simulations and section 6 
concludes. 
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2. Theoretical and Empirical Framework 
 
We  commence  by  setting  out  the  overall  theoretical  and  empirical 
framework  on  which  our  analysis  is  based.  Our  model  is  based  on  standard 
economic theory, where as a starting point an equilibrium is considered where all 
workers  are  fully  employed.  The  most  general  model  would  not  restrict  the 
number  of  industries  that  may  produce  different  products,  and  allow  for  any 
number of labour input types, as well as allowing for any number of capital inputs 
into production. We develop such a model in Appendix A.1. 
Here we elaborate a simplified version of this model, where we allow only 
for one output and make the assumption that production follows a nested CES 
technology. We analyse the model under different assumptions about the elasticity 
of capital supply. We then develop the empirical implications of the model. 
 
2.1 Theory 
 Following much of the literature on the effect of immigration on wages,
5 
we assume that the number of output types (output being denoted y) is equal to 
one. However, we allow for a multitude of labour types, i=1,…,L.  Let the output 
be traded on world markets at a fixed price which we normalise to equal 1. 
We adopt a nested CES production function whereby if labour supplied by 
the ith type is li and capital used is K then 
 
[ ]
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i i il H            (1-b) 
 
where  H  is  a  CES  aggregate  of  purely  labour  inputs,  αi  determines 
productivity  of  the  ith  type  of  labour  and  σ≤1  determines  the  elasticity  of 
substitution  between  labour  types,  while  β  determines  relative  productivity  of 
labour and capital and s≤1 determines the elasticity of substitution between capital 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Altonji and Card (1991), Borjas (2003), Card and Lewis (2007), Manacorda, et al. 
(2006) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006). We therefore exclude possible alternative adjustments to 
immigration in a world with traded goods, through factor price equalisation, as discussed by e.g. 
Lewis (2004). We also exclude adjustment through technology, see Lewis (2005).     6 
and labour.   We assume without loss of generality, a numbering of labour types 
such that αi> αj for i>j. 
Firms can employ either native labour 
0
i l  or immigrant labour 
1
i l  of each 
type i. We assume that native and immigrant labour of the same type are both 
perfect substitutes and equally productive:  .
1 0
i i i l l l + =
6 For the markets for each 
labour type to clear
7, li=ni for all i, where ni is the supply of labour of the ith type. 
The labour supply is made up of natives 
0
i n  and immigrants 
1
i n , 
0 1
i i i n n n = + , so 
that  ) (
1 0 m N n i i i π π + =   where 
0
i i N n =∑   is  total  native  labour  supply, 
0 0 / i i n N π =  is the fraction of native labour of the ith type, 
1 1 1 / i i j j n n π = ∑  is the 
fraction of immigrant labour of the ith type and 
1 / j j m n N =∑  is the ratio of the 
immigrant to native labour force. First order conditions for cost-minimising input 
choice imply that the real wage of the ith type of labour, wi, equals the marginal 
product of labour. Similarly, the price of capital, ρ, equals the marginal product of 
capital. Deriving the first order conditions and taking logs results in equilibrium 
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6 Note that we do not identify labour types with education-age cells; thus, we do not make the 
assumption criticised by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Manacorda et al. (2006) that immigrants 
and natives are perfect substitutes in a given education-age cell.  
7 We assume the existence of an equilibrium in which wages wi are ordered across types similarly 
to productivity αi.  It is possible that if low skilled types were in sufficiently short supply the 
wages required to equate their supply and demand would exceed wages of the highly skilled.  If 
the highly skilled are able to do low skilled jobs then clearly this would not be an equilibrium.  
Strictly, the appropriate equilibrium condition would require that for each skill type the demand 
for those with skills no lower than that type should be no less than the supply of those with skills 
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8  Then the 
equilibrium change in native log wages as a reaction to changes in the immigrant-
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 is a parameter depending on 
capital mobility θ, capital-labour substitutability s and the labour share ψ.  The 
pattern of the effects of immigration along the native wage distribution therefore 






  along  that 
distribution. 
Consider firstly the case  1 φ = , which arises if capital is perfectly mobile 
(θ=∞), capital and labour are perfectly substitutable (s=1) or the capital share is 
zero (ψ=1). Since  1 = ∑
i
i ω , the expression in parenthesis in (3) is the difference 
at that point in the distribution between the relative density of immigrants and 
natives and a weighted average of these relative densities across the entire skill 
distribution. The wage of any skill type is decreased by immigration if and only if 
the intensity of immigration at that point in the distribution of types exceeds an 
                                                 
8 All discussion below covers the full range for possible values for θ , and is therefore compatible 
with Ottaviano and Peri’s (2006) observation to allow for mobility of capital.     8 
appropriately  weighted  average  of  immigration  intensity  across  the  whole 
distribution.  If  the  distribution  of  skill  types  in  the  immigrant  inflow  exactly 
matches that in the native labour force, πi
0= πi
1 for all i, then the effect on wages 
is everywhere zero. 
If capital is used, imperfectly mobile and imperfectly substitutable with 
labour then  1 φ <  and even immigration which matches the native labour force in 
composition will result in wage losses.  However the pattern of wage effects along 
the distribution will still be driven in just the same way by the relative density of 







The first order effect of immigration on mean native wages 
0
i i iwπ ∑ , also 
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where 
0 w is mean native wage before immigration.  The first order effect 
is  negative  unless  φ =1  or  σ=1.    Native  labour  on  average  is  harmed  by 
immigration, though obviously some labour types may gain if the composition of 
immigrant and native labour differ.  
However if capital is perfectly mobile so that  φ =1 then the first order 
effect  is  zero.    Capital  inflows  follow  the  inflow  of  labour  to  keep  marginal 
product of capital constant, immigrant labour is paid the value of its marginal 
product  and  there  is  no  change  at  the  margin  in  payments  to  native  labour.  
Turning for this case to second order effects, we obtain (as shown in Appendix 
A.2) 
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so that second order effects on the mean native wage are positive if the 
immigrant inflow differs at all from native labour in its mix of skill types. Note 
that the last term in parentheses is a weighted variance: it is larger the larger the 
disparity between the immigrant and native skill distribution and disappears only 
if 
1 0
i i π π =  for all i. For small levels of immigration we should therefore expect to 
find mean native wages rising if capital is perfectly mobile. Indeed, there can be a 
positive  surplus  for  labour  if  capital  is  fairly  mobile  and  immigrant  labour 
sufficiently different to native labour, as we show quantitatively in section 6. This 
is the conventional “immigration surplus” argument establishing that immigration 
is beneficial to native factors – immigrating labour is paid less than the value of 
what it adds to production and the surplus must be returned to native factors if 
profits are zero
9. 
That does not, of course, mean that in this case wages increase throughout 















π ∑ . In particular it will be those who 
compete with immigrants who will suffer wage losses
10.  
 
2.2 Empirical Specification 
We turn now to empirical implementation of the CES model as outlined 
above.  Take the factor return equations in (2-a)-(2-b), combine with a capital 
supply equation and let ρ0 be the equilibrium return to capital at m=0.  
Taking a first order Taylor expansion of (2-a) around m=0 using the earlier 
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∑     we  obtain  an  approximate 
expression for the wage of the ith type: 
                                                 
9 Appendix A.1 establishes that these qualitative observations apply in a much more general model 
with many outputs and many perfectly mobile capital inputs, assuming only constant returns to 
scale. 
10 For example, any native subgroup of identical composition to immigrants must lose as shown in 
Appendix: A.2  
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Our data come from different regions at different points in time and our 
empirical  approach  is  based  on  using  variation  in  immigrant  inflows  across 
different regions in the UK. We therefore observe a distribution of native and 
immigrant wages in different regions at different points in time. We choose to 
identify different skill types i with different locations in the observed distribution 
of native wages. In other words, if Wprt denotes the pth percentile of the native 
wage distribution in region r at time t then, in terms of the earlier theory, we 





0 π . 
Accordingly, we adopt a model 
 
ln prt pr pt p rt p rt prt W a b c X m γ ε ≈ + + + +     (6) 
 
where  at  each  point  in  the  distribution  p  we  include  region  and  time  effects, 
pt pr b a + .  The former capture the role of technological parameters given the initial 
skill distribution and capital price in the region, whereas the latter capture the 
influence of changes in national capital prices on the chosen capital-labour ratio. 
Controls for changing age and skill composition of the native labour force are 
included in Xrt.  The coefficient on the region-specific immigrant-native ratio is 







γ σ φ ω
π π
 
= − −    
 
∑ .  Constancy of 
this across regions reflects an assumption that immigrant skill composition relates     11 
similarly to native skill composition in different regions and periods
11.  Finally εprt
 
is a random error term.  
 
3. Background, Data and Descriptives 
 
3.1 Migration to the UK 
In 2001, the last census year, 4.8m immigrants lived in the UK, which 
amounts  to  8.47  percent  of  the  total  population.  Over  3.5m  of  them  were  of 
working age (16-65), so that they counted for 9.75 percent of the working age 
population. Since then, Britain has experienced a further increase in its foreign 
born population, and the share of foreign born in the total working age population 
in 2005 was 11.5%. The share of foreign born population in the UK is thus similar 
to the corresponding share in the US, which was 11.9% in 2004
12. Until the late 
1990s almost one third of the foreign born population in the UK used to be from 
Western European countries, one fifth from the Indian Sub-continent, and less 
than 2 percent from Eastern Europe. Since the late 1990s migration from Eastern 
Europe has intensified, and Eastern Europeans constitute now over 5% of the total 
foreign born population, while Western Europeans are less than one fourth and 
immigrants from the Indian Sub-Continent are still about 20%.  
 
3.2 The Data 
The main dataset we use for our analysis is the UK Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) over the period from 1997 till 2005. The LFS, established in 1973, is a 
sample  survey  of  households  living  at  private  addresses  in  Great  Britain, 
conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). We restrict our analysis to 
Great Britain, and omit Northern Ireland. Since 1992, the LFS has been a rotating 
                                                 
11  It  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  capital  is  perfectly  mobile  between  regions  (but  not 
necessarily internationally). In that case the capital price would be the same in all regions and any 
influence of immigration on national capital price would be absorbed fully in the time effects. In 
such  a  case  it  would  make  sense  to  identify  ( )
0 0 1
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12 Source: US Census Bureau – Current Population Survey.     12 
quarterly panel. Each sampled address is interviewed for 5 consecutive times at 3 
monthly  intervals.  The  sample  size  is  about  55,000  responding  households  in 
Great Britain every quarter, representing about 0.2% of the population. 
The LFS collects information on respondents' personal circumstances and 
their  labour  market  status  during  a  reference  period  of  one  to  four  weeks 
immediately prior to the interview. From the 1992 -1993 winter quarter onwards 
the LFS contains information on gross weekly wages and on number of hours 
worked. Initially this information was asked only in the final wave, but from the 
1997 spring quarter onwards questions on wages were asked during the first and 
the fifth interview.  
Spatial  information  is  available  at  regional  level,  where  region  is 
determined  according  to  usual  residence.  The  LFS  originally  identifies  20 
regions
13. We unify Inner and Outer London into Greater London, and Strathclyde 
and  the  Rest  of  Scotland  into  Scotland,  to  create  territorially  homogeneous 
regions, and limit our analysis to Great Britain, dropping Northern Ireland. We 
have therefore 17 regions, and the usual average sample size for the period we 
consider is about 19,297
14.  
We  combine  information  from  the  LFS  with  information  from  various 
years  of  the  UK  Population  Census.  The  Census  is  a  decennial  survey  of  all 
people and households. The most recent Census was in 2001. Although providing 
information on age, education, and employment status, the UK Census has no 
information on wages. Moreover comparability across Census years is not always 
possible, as variable classifications change quite often. This is for instance the 
case for occupation and education between the 1991 and 2001 Census. In our 
analysis below, we use information from the 1991 and 1981 Census to construct 
variables for immigrants’ geographical distribution.  
                                                 
13 Tyne & Wear, Rest of Northern Region, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Rest of Yorkshire & 
Humberside, East Midlands, East Anglia, Inner London, Outer London, Rest of South East, South 
West,    West  Midlands  (Metropolitan  counties),  Rest  of  West  Midlands,  Greater  Manchester, 
Merseyside, Rest of North West, Wales, Strathclyde, Rest of Scotland, Northern Ireland. 
14 The average population size in a region is 2,163,121.     13 
 
3.3 Descriptive Evidence 
In 1971, the percentage of foreign born individuals on the total population 
in Great Britain was 5.9%, or 3 million individuals. Over the next decades this 
number increased to 6.3% (1981), 6.8% (1991) and 8.47% (2001). Between 1989 
and 1997, the foreign born working age (16-65) population on the total working 
age population increased by only 0.7 percentage points. In contrast, between 1997 
and  2005  the  percentage  of  the  foreign  born  in  the  working  age  population 
increased by almost 3 percentage points. This is the period we consider for our 
analysis, and we concentrate on the working age population only. 
Table 1 reports some characteristics of the native born and foreign born 
population  in  Britain,  where  among  the  foreign  born  we  distinguish  between 
earlier and more recent immigrants. We define as “earlier immigrants” all foreign 
born who have been in the UK two years or more at the time of interview; we 
define as “recent immigrants” all immigrants who arrived in the UK over the last 
two  years.  This  distinction  is  important  as  our  empirical  analysis  is  based  on 
variation in the stock of immigrants between two subsequent years; this variation 
is driven by recent arrivals.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
In Table 1, we report average age and educational attainments for 1997 
and 2005, the first and the last year of our observation period. Natives and earlier 
immigrants  are  very  similar  in  their  average  age  (around  40)  while  new 
immigrants are about 10 years younger. The percentage of females on the other 
hand is roughly similar, with a slight drop for more recent immigrants between 
1997 and 2005.  
The lower panel of the table reports educational attainment of the different 
groups.  We  base  our  measures  on  information  about  the  age  at  which  the 
individual left full time education
15, and we classify individuals in three groups: 
                                                 
15 The LFS has two alternative measures for educational achievements, age at which individuals 
left full time education, and “highest qualification achieved”. The problem with the latter measure     14 
low (left full time education before the age of 17), intermediate (left full time 
education between 17 and 20), and high (left full time education after age 20). For 
natives and earlier immigrants, the table shows an improvement in educational 
attainment  between  1997  and  2005.  However,  earlier  immigrants  are  better 
educated  than  natives  in  both  years,  with  a  higher  percentage  in  the  highest 
category, and lower percentages in the lowest category. Nearly one in two of new 
arrivals is in the highest educational category, and slightly more than one in 10 in 
the  lowest  category.  The  educational  attainment  of  new  arrivals  have  roughly 
remained constant over the period considered.  
Recent  immigrants  may  not  be  able  to  make  use  of  their  educational 
background  to  its  full  potential,  as  they  may  lack  complementary  skills  like 
language,  or  they  may  have  to  start  searching  for  their  best  job  match  (see 
Eckstein and Weiss 2004). In Table 2 we display the occupational distribution of 
immigrants  in  2004  and  2005,  where  we  distinguish  between  6  occupational 
categories using the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC). 
We exclude employers and the self-employed because we do not have information 
on their wages. The last column shows the average wage by occupation in the 
years considered, expressed in 2005 prices
16.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The occupational distribution of those who have been in the country for at 
least  2  years  is  similar  to  the  native  born,  except  for  the  higher  immigrant 
concentration in the highest paid category, and the slightly higher concentration of 
natives in the two intermediate categories. However, recent immigrants, i.e. those 
who arrived within 2 years of the interview, although being better educated than 
the overall immigrant population (see table 1), tend to be in lower occupation 
categories,  with  the  partial  exception  of  higher  managerial  and  professional 
occupations:  47%  are  in  the  lowest  three  occupational  groups,  compared  with 
27% of natives and of earlier immigrants. This suggests that new arrivals, unable 
to put their human capital into immediate use, start lower down the occupational 
                                                                                                                                      
is that it is defined on the British education system and classifies all foreign classifications as 
“other qualification” (see the discussion in the appendix of Manacorda et al. (2006)). 
16 We discount wages using the 2005-based CPI.     15 
distribution, and compete with native workers much further down the distribution. 
This  finding  mirrors  results  for  Israel  on  considerable  downgrading  of  new 
immigrants - see the work by Eckstein and Weiss (2004).  
In  table  3  we  break  down  the  occupational  distribution  by  educational 
attainment, using the same grouping. The figures show that within each education 
group,  recent  immigrants  are  distributed  more  towards  the  lower  end  of  the 
occupational distribution. For instance, while among highly skilled natives, only 
5% work in the lowest two occupational categories, this is the case for 11% of 
earlier immigrants, but 26% of recent immigrants. The respective numbers for the 
intermediate education category are 19%, 29% and  63%.  Again,  this  suggests 
considerable downgrading of recent immigrants within educational categories.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
In our empirical analysis, we will associate the changes in wages across 
different spatial units with the changes in the stock of immigrants. Our theoretical 
model above suggests that the immigrant population will exert pressure on wages 
of  natives  at  those  parts  of  the  distribution  where  the  relative  density  of 
immigrants is higher than that of the weighted relative density of natives.  
Where we actually find immigrants in the native wage distribution can be 
straightforwardly estimated from the data: in each year, and for each immigrant, 
we can calculate the proportion of natives with a lower wage. In figure 1, we 
display  the  distribution
17  of  immigrants  along  the  wage  distribution  of  native 
workers, where again we distinguish between immigrants who have been in the 
country for less than 2 years, and immigrants who have been in the country for 
less than 6 years.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
                                                 
17  These  are  kernel  density  estimates.  Given  that  the  variable  in  question  is  bounded,  by 
construction, between 0 and 1, conventional kernel estimation with fixed window width would 
give misleading estimates at the extremes.  The kernel estimates are therefore calculated on the log 
of the odds of the position in the non-immigrant distribution and appropriately transformed.     16 
The dashed line shows the density of recent immigrants along the wage 
distribution  of  natives.  Contrary  from  what  we  should  expect  based  on 
information on their educational background, the density of recent immigrants is 
higher  than  that  of  natives  everywhere  below  the  25
th  percentile  of  the  wage 
distribution. On the other hand, it is lower between the 25
th percentile and the 90
th 
percentile, and higher again afterwards. The dotted line shows the distribution for 
immigrants who have been in the country for less than 6 years. The overall pattern 
is still similar, but it is apparent that some “upgrading” has taken place, with less 
mass below the 25
th percentile. Based on these figures, we should expect therefore 
that immigrants put a pressure on wages below the 25
th percentile of the native 
wage distribution.  
Where would we find immigrants along the native wage distribution if we 
had allocated them according to their observed age and education distribution? 
We illustrate that in Figure 2. Figure 2 is obtained by estimating a flexible log 
wage regression for natives, where we condition on five age categories and four 
educational categories, as well as interactions between the two
18. We estimate that 
equation separately for males and females. If immigrants and natives are perfect 
substitutes  within  age  and  education  categories,  then  immigrants  should  be 
located in the native wage distribution according to their predicted wages. We 
predict  wages  for  all  recent  immigrants,  where  we  add  an  error  term  to  the 
prediction  which  is  drawn  from  a  normal  distribution,  with  heteroscedastic 
variance according to age, education and gender. We then draw the density of 
immigrants across the native wage distribution.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
The difference between figure 1 and 2 is striking. In figure 2, immigrants 
are strongly present at the very low end of the wage distribution; however, above 
the 7
th percentile, their density is much lower than that of native workers. On the 
other  hand,  the  density  becomes  increasingly  larger  above  the  60
th  percentile. 
                                                 
18 Our regressors include five age categories  (16/25, 26/35, 36/45, 46/55, 56/65), four educational 
categories, based on age at which individuals left full time education (before 16, 16/18, 19/20, 
after 20), interaction between the two, a dummy for London residents, and quarter dummies. We 
fit separate models for men and women and for different years.     17 
Based on this figure, we would expect immigrants to exert a pressure on wages at 
the  bottom  of the  native  wage  distribution,  and  above  the  median.  The  figure 
shows clearly that it may be misleading to pre-allocate recent immigrants across 
the native skill distribution based on their observable characteristics.  
 
4. Estimation  
 
4.1 Implementation and Identification 
In our empirical analysis, we estimate the effects of immigration along the 
distribution  of  wages.  Our  starting  point  is  the  empirical  model  that  derives 
directly from our theoretical framework, as in (6). The parameter we estimate in 
that model is a combination of the elasticity of substitution between skill groups, 
and the relative density of immigrants at the particular part of the native wage 
distribution.  As  we  explain  above,  the  relative  size  of  the  parameter  should 
directly correspond to the density of immigrants, as we have illustrated in Figure 
1.  
The way we implement that model is to regress differences over time in 
percentiles of log wages across different regions in the UK on changes in the 
fraction of immigrants to natives  rt m ∆ , time dummies  t β , and changes in the 
average age of immigrant and native workers in the region as well as the ratio of 
high (intermediate) to low educated native workers,  prt c ∆ : 
 
prt rt p prt t prt m c W ε γ β ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ln         (7) 
 
It is important to note that our approach does not depend in any way on 
pre-assignment  of  immigrants  to  particular  skill  cells.  For  estimation,  we  use 
variation across spatial units r and across time. This approach may potentially 
lead to an overly optimistic picture of immigration on native outcomes if natives 
leave labour markets that experienced in-migration. However, if this occurs, it is 
likely to be less relevant in our case, as the large regional definitions we use in our 
analysis make it more likely that any movements will be internalised (see Borjas     18 
et  al.  1997  for  a  similar  argument).  We  nevertheless  check  this  by  using  an 
extension of the methodology in Card (2001), adapted to our quantile approach, 
and find no evidence for native responses to immigration
19 (details are available 
on request). In addition, we condition on native skill group proportions, which 
should take account of changes in the native skill group over time. Of course, 
there are obvious concerns about whether such proportions ought themselves to be 
regarded as endogenous in such a setting and there are less obvious instruments to 
deal with the issue. 
A  further  problem  is  the  endogenous  allocation  of  immigrants  into 
particular regional labour markets. One solution is to use instrumental variables 
estimation.  We  follow  the  literature  and  use  settlement  pattern  of  previous 
immigrants as instruments. This instrument has been used in various studies in 
this literature, following Altonji and Card (1991), and is motivated by a number of 
studies (see for instance Bartel 1989, Jaeger 2007b, Munshi 2003) showing that 
settlement patterns of previous immigrants are a main determinant of immigrants’ 
location choices.
20 When estimating equation (7) we use years 1997-2005, and we 
compute the ratio of immigrants to natives for each year in each of the 17 regions. 
Estimation  in  differences  eliminates  region  specific  permanent  effects  that  are 
correlated with immigrant settlement patterns and economic conditions alike. We 
instrument  the  change  in  this  ratio  using  two  alternative  but  closely  related 
instruments: the 1991 ratio of immigrants to natives for each of these regions, 
from the Census of Population, and four period lags of the ratio of immigrants to 
natives in each  region from the  LFS. Both instrumental variables are strongly 
correlated to the ratio of immigrants to natives. The first stage regression of the 
change in the immigrant-native ratio on the 1991 ratio and time dummies gives a 
coefficient of 0.068 with a t-statistic of 9.51
21 , while the partial 
2 R  of  excluded 
instruments is 0.29, and the F-test for their significance is 90.47. A regression of 
the endogenous variable on the fourth lag of the immigrants-natives ratio and on 
time dummies gives a coefficient of 0.043, with a t-statistic of 12.22, while the 
                                                 
19 Absence of counterbalancing native outflows is also detected by Card and DiNardo (2000), Card 
(2001) and Cortes (2006) among others. Borjas et al. (1997) on the other hand do find significant 
displacement effects of immigrants on resident natives. 
20 See among others Card (2001), Card and Lewis (2007), Cortes (2006), Cortes and Tessada 
(2008), Lewis (2005), Ottaviano and Peri (2006, 2007) and Saiz (2007) for a similar strategy. 
21 Standard errors are clustered by region.     19 
partial 
2 R  of excluded instruments is 0.3 and the F-test for their significance is 
149.27. The instruments are valid under the assumption that economic shocks are 
not too persistent. We report in table 4 the results of Arellano-Bond tests for first 
and  second  order  serial  correlation  in  the  residuals  of  regressions  for  all  the 
dependent  variables  we  consider.  Absence  of  second  order  serial  correlation 




[Table 4 here] 
 
In addition we perform several robustness checks, using instruments that 
are based on settlement patterns further aback. We use further lags of the ratio of 
immigrants to natives (going back to the 14th lag) and the 1981 immigrant-native 
ratio. We also construct a series of instruments based on the predicted inflow of 
immigrants in each region, along the lines of Card (2001). We take account of the 
area  of  origin  of  immigrants  and  design  a  variable  which  predicts  the  total 
immigrant  inflow  in  each  region  in  every  year,  net  of  contemporary  demand 
shocks.  In  order  to  do  so  we  divide  immigrants  into  15  areas  of  origin
22  and 
calculate the number of immigrants from each area who entered the UK in every 
year. We then allocate every group of immigrants across regions according to the 
location of previous immigrants from the same area
23. Results obtained with these 
alternative  instrumental  variables  are  very  similar  to  those  obtained  with  the 
instruments described above, which we  report  in the tables  (see Table A1 for 
estimation results for average wages. Results along the distribution are available 
on request).  
                                                 
22 Irish Republic, Old Commonwealth, Eastern Africa (New Commonwealth, NC), Other Africa 
(NC), Caribbean (NC), Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, South East Asia (NC), Cyprus, Other New 
Commonwealth,  European Community (1992 members), Other Europe, China, Rest of the World. 




M = λ  
as the fraction of immigrants from area c in region i in a base period, then  ct ciM λ  is the predicted 
number of new immigrants from area c in region i in year t. As base periods, we experiment with 
different years: 1981, 1985, and 1991, using data from the LFS and for 1991 from the Census. 
Finally, we sum over all origin groups to obtain a predicted total immigrant inflow into region i 
which is  “cleansed” of local demand shocks :  ∑c ct ciM λ . Finally,  we divide this predicted 
inflow by the number of natives in the region at time t-2, to normalize by region size. 
     20 
 
4.2 Measurement 
As  we  explained  in  section  3.2  the  LFS  is  a  nationally  representative 
survey, and since the immigrant population accounted for less than 10% of the 
total population for most of the years we consider (and much less so in some 
regions),  the  number  of  observations  for  immigrants  may  be  quite  small. 
Therefore  measures  of  regional  immigrant  concentration  may  suffer  from 
measurement error due to small sample size.  As we estimate our equations in first 
differences,  this  may  amplify  the  impact  of  measurement  error,  resulting  in  a 
possibly severe downward bias. Instrumental variable estimation accounts for the 
measurement error problem as long as the measurement error in the instrumental 
variable is uncorrelated with the measurement error in the variable of interest. 
Aydemir and Borjas (2006) argue that, if the instrument of choice is some lagged 
measure of the immigrant share, and measurement error is correlated over time, 
the instruments may not be valid. In our case this is not a concern because we use 
a minimum of four lags as instrument, therefore avoiding any correlation in the 
measurement error of the endogenous variable and the instrument even in first 
differences. Alternatively we use as an instrument the immigrant concentration 
from the Census, whose measurement error is independent from that in the LFS. 
We use four different measures for average wages to test the robustness of 
our results. First we use the simple average regional wage. Second, we compute a 
robust  regional  average  by  trimming  in  every  region  and  year  the  wage 
distribution of natives at the region- and year- specific 1
st and 99
th percentile. This 
measure  reduces  the  impact  of  outliers  on  our  averages  by  considering  only 
central observations in the wage distribution. Third, we calculate a wage index 
constructed as the weighted sum of the average wages in each education group, 
defined as above in terms of years of education (see discussion in section 3.3). 
The educational composition of the native population is kept constant by choosing 
as weights the share of each education group in the native population in a base 
year (which we choose to be 1998)
24.   By holding constant the skill composition 
                                                 
24 The wage index is constructed for each region as follows. First we calculate et w , the average 
wage for education group e=1,2,3 in time t=1997,…,2005. Then we calculate the time-invariant     21 
of  the  assessed  population,  this  measure  is  isolated  from  compositional  issues 
associated with changing native skills.  The theoretical results of earlier sections 
show that wage changes could raise average wages in the native population (if 
capital  is  perfectly  elastic)  holding  skill  composition  fixed  and  this  measure 
comes closest to capturing that. Finally, we use a robust version of this index 
based on wages in the trimmed sample. The robust index is constructed using 
robust  average  wages  for  each  education  group,  where  the  average  wages  by 
education group are computed on the same trimmed sample as explained above.  
In table A2 in the Appendix we report means and standard deviations of all 
the  variables  we  use,  and  in  table  A3  we  show  the  year  specific  means  and 




5.1 Effects along the wage distribution 
We now turn to our analysis of immigration on wages of native workers. 
We commence by estimating the effect of immigration along the distribution of 








percentile of the wage distribution. Columns 1 and 2 present OLS results and 
columns 3, 4, and 5, 6 present IV results, using alternative instruments. Reported 
results  are  based  on  difference  estimations.  Columns  2,  4,  and  6  control,  in 
addition  to  time  effects,  for  average  natives’  and  immigrants’  age,  and  the 
logarithm  of  the  ratio  of  natives  in  each  education  group  to  natives  with  no 
qualifications.  Estimation is based on yearly data for the years 1997-2005 and for 
17 regions.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
The regression results show a sizeable negative impact of immigration on 
the lower wage quantiles. According to IV estimates in column 4, which use the 
                                                                                                                                      
weights  98 98 1998 N Ne e = π , the proportion of natives in education group e in 1998. Finally, we 
define the index  ∑ = = 3 , 2 , 1 98 e et e t w I π      22 
1991 settlement patterns of immigrants drawn from the Census as instrument and 
include all controls, the impact of an inflow of immigrants of the size of 1% of the 
native population would lead to a 0.6% decrease in the 5
th wage percentile and a 
0.4% decrease in the 10
th wage percentile. On the other hand, it would lead to an 
almost  0.7%  increase  in  the  median  wage  and  a  0.5%  increase  in  the  90
th  
percentile. Estimates using the fourth lag of the ratio of immigrants to natives (see 
columns 5 and 6) give the same picture, but with slightly smaller coefficients. 
Both IV estimates indicate a strong positive impact of immigration around the 
median  wage,  but  a  negative  effect  at  the  bottom  of  the  wage  distribution. 
According to these estimates, immigration seems to put downward pressure on the 
lower part of the wage distribution, but increases wages at the upper part of the 
distribution. 
We note that the OLS estimates are smaller in absolute magnitude than the 
IV estimates. This is not what we should expect if immigrants allocate in regions 
which experienced positive economic shocks. However, as we point out above, 
instrumentation removes also measurement error, which leads to a bias towards 
zero in the estimated parameters.
25 Our results suggest that the measurement error 
bias is larger in magnitude than the selection bias.
26   
In terms of magnitude, our estimates in column 6 of table 5 suggest that 
each 1 percent increase in the immigrant/native working age population ratio led 
over the period studied to a 0.5 percent decrease in wages at the 1
st decile, a 0.6 
percent increase in wages at the median, and a 0.4 percent increase in wages at the 
9
th decile. The average increase in the immigrant/native working age population 
ratio  over  the  period  considered  was  about  0.35%  per  year,  whereas  the  real 
hourly wage increased over the period by 18p (4.28%) per year at the 1
st decile, 
by 25p (3.25%) per year at the median, and by 53p (3.18%) per year at the 9
th 
decile (in 2005 terms). Therefore immigration held wages back by 0.7p per hour 
                                                 
25 Aydemir and Borjas (2006) show that the measurement error induced attenuation bias becomes 
exponentially worse as the sample size used to calculate the immigrant concentration declines, and 
that  adjusting  for  attenuation  bias  can  easily  double  or  triple  the  estimated  wage  impact  of 
immigration. 
26 It is worthwhile to note that the standard errors of the IV estimator are smaller than the standard 
errors of the OLS estimator in differences. The reason is that standard errors are calculated on the 
assumption  of  lack  of  serial  correlation  in  the  residuals  of  the  levels  equation  so  that  the 
differenced  equation  is  assumed  to  have  residuals  with  a  specific  pattern  of  first  order  serial 
correlation.    OLS  is  not  efficient  given  such  serial  correlation,  even  under  exogeneity  of  the 
regressors, and IV may accordingly give lower standard errors.      23 
at  the  10
th  percentile,  contributed  about  1.5p  per  hour  to  wage  growth  at  the 
median and slightly more than 2p per hour at the 90
th percentile.  
To obtain a more detailed picture, we have estimated the model at a finer 
grid  of  wage  percentiles.  In  figure  3  we  plot  the  estimated  coefficients  of 
regressions from the 5
th to the 95
th percentile, in intervals of 5 percentage points 
for the IV regressions, using the specification in column 6 of the table. The dotted 
lines are the 95% confidence interval. The graph shows the negative impact on 
low wage percentiles and the positive impact on percentiles further up the wage 
distribution.   
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
The graph of wage effects illustrated in the figure is strikingly similar to 
the distribution of immigrants along the native wage distribution, as shown in 
Figure  1.  The  wage  effects  curve  is  like  a  mirror  image  of  the  observed 
distribution  of  recent  immigrants  over  the  native  wage  distribution.    The 
consonance of these two independent pieces of evidence offers strong support for 
the pattern of effects as suggested by our theoretical model. Overall, these results 
suggest that immigration tends to stretch the wage distribution, particularly below 
the  median.  Our  IV  coefficients  imply  that  an  increase  in  the  immigrant 
population by about 1 percent of the native population would increases the 50-10 
differential  by  about  1  percentage  point,  but  there  is  hardly  any  effect  of 
immigration on the wage distribution above the median. 
 
5.3 Immigration and Average Wages 
In table 6 we present results on mean regressions from estimating equation 
(7),  using  the  different  measures  for  average  wages  which  we  discuss  above. 
Results  are  consistent  across  all  specifications,  and  show  a  positive  impact  of 
immigration on natives’ average wages throughout.  
  
[Table 6 here] 
     24 
The coefficients on the wage index (in the third row), and on the robust 
wage index (in the fourth row) capture most closely the mean impact at fixed skill 
composition  corresponding  to  our  theoretical  model  (see  section  4.3).  These 
estimates indicate that an increase in the foreign born population of the size of 1% 
of the native population leads to an increase of between 0.2% and 0.3% in average 
wages.  As  the  average  yearly  increase  in  the  immigrant/native  ratio  over  our 
sample period (1997-2005) was about 0.35%, and the average real wage growth 
just over 3 percent, immigration contributed about 3.5-4.5 percent to annual real 
wage growth. These estimates are similar in magnitude to those obtained in other 
studies finding positive wage effects of immigration, such as Friedberg (2001) and 
Ottaviano and Peri (2007).  
 
6. Explaining positive mean wage effects 
 
 How can we explain the positive impact of immigration on mean native 
wages? One reason, as set out in recent work by Ottaviano and Peri (2006), may 
be imperfect substitutability of immigrants and natives within skill groups
27 so 
that  native  marginal  product  can  be  enhanced  by  expansion  of  the  immigrant 
labour  force.  We  explore  here  a  variety  of  possible  reasons  which  are  not 
dissimilar in spirit.  Common to each is the idea that immigrants are paid less than 
the value of what they contribute to production, generating therefore a surplus.  
Exactly  who  captures  this  surplus  depends  upon  assumptions  made  about 
production decisions. Under conditions implying zero profits, such a surplus will 
result in enhanced payments to pre-existing factors of production.  If factors other 
than labour, and in particular capital, are supplied sufficiently elastically, because 
for example of international mobility, then the surplus will accrue in increased 
average wages to native labour. 
  We first consider the possibility that a surplus arises if immigration takes 
the economy down its labour demand curve. We discuss this surplus in section 
2.1. We show that such a surplus is second order and may create an increase in 
native  wages  at  larger  inflows,  and  if  capital  supply  is  elastic.  Secondly,  we 
                                                 
27 See also D’Amuri, Ottaviano and Peri (2008) and Peri (2007) for a similar argument, and 
Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) for a reappraisal of Ottaviano and Peri (2006).     25 
explore arguments that rely on immigrant wages falling below marginal products 
and imply first order surplus effects. We consider two such possibilities.  In the 
first of these, in the pre-migration situation, wages paid are different from the 
marginal product in local labour markets. This situation could occur if wages are 
sticky, for instance through institutions, natives are insufficiently mobile to re-
establish an equilibrium, and immigrants tend to go to areas where the difference 
between  wage  and  marginal  product  is  largest.  In  the  second  possibility, 
immigrants work in jobs appropriate to lower skills and are paid below the value 
of their marginal product. We provide strong evidence for downgrading in section 
3.3. This will also generate a surplus, which will be captured by native workers.  
Below we will explore each of these reasons in detail.  Based on our data 
and  the  parameters  we  have  estimated,  we  then  assess  through  simulation, 
whether immigration of the magnitude observed in our data could account for 
wage effects of the size found through such a means.  We conclude that while it 
seems  unlikely  that  any  of  these  arguments  alone  explain  the  size  of  positive 
effects, it might be explained through a combination of the different explanations. 
. 
6.1 Equilibrium immigration surplus 
We know from theoretical considerations (see Section 2.1) that positive 
effects on native wages are compatible with a standard equilibrium model with 
differentiated  labour  and  elastically  supplied  capital.    Immigration  generates  a 
surplus which is paid to inelastically supplied native factors and which will accrue 
to labour if other factors are supplied elastically.  Such an effect is second order 
however – the marginal impact is zero.   
Can the positive mean wage effects of the magnitude found in our analysis 
be accounted for by equilibrium surplus arguments for the sort of magnitudes of 
immigration observe in our data?  To investigate this, we simulate our model for 
the distribution of immigrants we observe in the data, and establish the overall 
effects on wages, for different sets of model parameters. To do this we first need 
to augment the equations of Section 2.1 with a capital supply equation. Assuming 
a  constant  elasticity  of  capital  supply  θ,  the  system  of  equations  used  for     26 
simulation of the effects of immigration consists of equations (3-a), (3-c) and the 
capital supply equation  ρ θ ln ln ln + = A K . 
For simplicity we hold the labour share parameter β constant at 0.5.  The 
native ability distribution is set at  1 = i π  for i=1,…,100 so that simulated wages 
are percentiles of the distribution. The ability distribution, αi, is then chosen to 
replicate  the  observed  wage  distribution  at  m=0.      These  parameters  are  kept 
constant  across  simulations.  Parameters  varied  are  the  elasticity  of  supply  of 
capital,  θ,  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  labour  types,  1/(1-σ),  and  the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, 1/(1-s).  
We  consider  firstly  an  ability  distribution  for  immigrants  to  match  the 
estimated wage distribution of immigrants shown in Figure 1.  On this basis we 
are  able  to  simulate  the  effect  on  mean  native  wages  for  different  extents  of 
immigration, m, as shown in Table 7 (in the columns headed ‘Observed’).  All 
entries are percentage changes in mean native wage. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
As can be seen, and confirming the observations made above, perfectly 
elastic supply of capital (θ=∞) or perfect substitutability of capital and labour 
(s=1) leads always to an unambiguously non-negative mean native wage effect as 
the immigration surplus accrues exclusively to native labour.    In none of these 
cases however is the size of this surplus large for immigrant ability distributions 
of the sort suggested by the distribution of immigrant wages observed. As we 
relax the assumption of elastic capital supply, mean native wage effects become 
negative  as  would  be  expected.    Although  immigrants  are  concentrated  at  the 
extremes of the native wage distribution they do not seem to be so to anything like 
the  extent  necessary  to  make  large  positive  equilibrium  mean  wage  effects 
plausible.   
For comparison, we also consider a more extreme case where immigrants 
are taken to be concentrated entirely (and therein evenly spread) in the lower half 
of the distribution of native abilities. This alternative scenario (in the columns 
headed ‘Extreme’) does generate larger effects, showing that the argument for 
large equilibrium effects would be sustainable for more extreme configurations of     27 
immigrant abilities. It may be, of course, that immigrants do differ from natives 
not so much in their distribution across percentiles of the native wage distribution 
but across labour types within percentiles and that the divergence between the 
native and immigrant ability distributions is therefore more extreme than Figure 1 
suggests. This  argument is similar to that made by  Ottaviano  and Peri  (2006) 
regarding  the  imperfect  substitutability  of  native  and  immigrant  labour  within 
observed skill cells. However, it remains difficult to argue that the conventional 
equilibrium  immigration  surplus  accounts  alone  for  mean  wage  effects  of  the 
magnitude estimated.  
 
6.2 Labour market disequilibrium 
The  above  illustration  seeks  to  rationalise  the  extent  to  which  positive 
mean wage effects can occur within an equilibrium framework. The native wage 
gains which might occur under the assumption of highly elastic capital supply are 
second  order,  which  is  inevitable  if  immigrant  labour  is  paid  the  value  of  its 
marginal product at the margin.  In this section we explore an alternative possible 
explanation based on an assumption of disequilibrium in the allocation of native 
labour across markets.   
The argument is similar to Borjas (2001) who suggests that immigration 
may  “grease  the  wheels”  of  the  labour  market.  The  idea  is  that  sluggish 
responsiveness of the native labour allocation to economic signals, because of 
costs  of  internal  migration  between  localities  or  sectors,  may  create  scope  for 
immigration to realise efficiency gains. If the marginal product of identical labour 
differs in different submarkets of the economy then there is scope for reallocation 
of  labour  across  submarkets  to  lead  to  greater  output.    If  mechanisms  exist 
whereby  inflows  of  relatively  mobile  immigrants  are  attracted  towards  those 
submarkets  where  labour  is  more  productive  (see  Jaeger  2007b)  then  such 
inefficiencies  can  be  eliminated.    However,  provided  immigrants  are  paid  the 
value of their marginal  products (as Borjas  assumes), the  associated  gains are 
captured by immigrants rather than flowing to native labour.  
Now  consider  the  possibility  that  wages  deviate  from  the  values  of 
marginal  products.  This  may  happen  for  instance  because  labour  market     28 
agreements impose equality of wages across regions or occupations or because 
wages  are  rigid  and  local  demand  conditions  lead  to  differences  in  the 
productivity of identical labour. It is quite plausible that this characterises many 
pre-migration situations.  
More  formally,  suppose  production  is  F(n,K).      We  can  think  in  this 
context of labour types corresponding not only to different skills but to different 
locations and occupations. The difference at the margin between the contribution 
of immigration to the value of production and payments made to migrants, per 




i i i i
n F F
w w
N n m n
π
    ∂ ∂ ∂
− = −     ∂ ∂ ∂     ∑ ∑ . 
 
If  we  allow  that  the  economy  is  out  of  equilibrium  so  that  marginal 
products and wages can diverge then this expression can be positive.  Indeed in 
this case it is possible that a simple proportional expansion of native labour could 
generate a surplus 
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although if we assume constant returns to scale, capital stocks which adjust 
elastically to keep marginal product of capital equal to a constant rate of return 
and zero profits
28 then  0 δ = . 
Immigration creates a first order surplus greater than would a comparable 
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28  Given  constant  returns  to  scale,  Euler’s  theorem  guarantees 
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− = − −   ∂ ∂   ∑ ∑   which  must be zero if capital is paid the 
value of its marginal product and profits are zero.     29 
 
so  that  the  covariance,  across  the  native  wage  distribution,  between 
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positive. Hence, assuming  0 δ = , immigration would generate a surplus if there 
were skill shortages which attracted strong immigrant inflows.  This could happen 
for example if there were labour market institutions fixing relative wages across 
different locations or occupations independently of differences in productivity and 
if no mechanism were to exist to direct native labour adequately towards areas or 
occupations of high productivity relative to wages.   
We can use these observations to put a bound on the magnitude of wage 
gaps required before immigration in order for this to rationalise the magnitude of 
average wage effects observed.  By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality 
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∑  is the chi-square divergence between the 
distributions of immigrant and native labour.  To the extent that we can estimate 
2
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If we identify wage types with percentiles of the native wage distribution 






 from which an estimate of 
2
10 χ  can indeed 
be calculated
29. Any such estimate will be somewhat sensitive to the bandwidth 
used  in  density  estimation.    If  we  concentrate  on  immigrants  arriving  in  the 
previous two years then a sensible range of bandwidths suggests values for 
2
10 χ  
around 0.3 which suggests, assuming  0 δ = , required wage gaps around 3 times 
the estimated average wage effect, which is quite large.   
As noted above when discussing the conventional equilibrium surplus, this 
may  be  misleadingly  high,  however,  if  the  inefficiency  in  allocation  of  native 
labour  is  not  predominantly  across  labour  types  at  different  percentiles  of  the 
wage distribution but across labour types differing in unobserved ways at similar 
points in the wage distribution. The extreme scenario considered in section 6.1, 
for comparison, would give the larger value 
2
10 1 χ = implying wage gaps of smaller 
magnitude, similar in size to the estimated wage effect
 .  
 
6.3 Downgrading 
A  third  possible  explanation,  and  one  requiring  no  divergence  between 
wages and marginal products in the native population, is simply that wages paid to 
immigrants fail to recognise their marginal product, perhaps because of allocation 
to jobs inappropriate to their true skills.  We observed in Section 3.3 that there is 
evidence of considerable downgrading among immigrants, particularly in earlier 
years of residence.  If, because say of uncertainties or informational difficulties 
leading  to  problems  in  recognition  of  qualifications,  recent  immigrants  find 
occupation in jobs in which they are more productive than native co-workers but 
are nonetheless paid at wage rates equal to natives then it is evident that this also 
will  generate  a  first  order  surplus.    Such  an  effect  would  be  expected  to  be 
                                                 
29 For each immigrant k of the K in the data let  k f
)
denote a consistent estimate of the density of 
immigrants    at  the  corresponding  point  in  the  native  wage  distribution,  ie
0 1 / i i π π   where 
immigrant k is of type i. Then 
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temporary as the mismatch is alleviated over time as immigrants move to more 
suitable jobs.   
Let  us  think  of  different  labour  types  as  corresponding  to  different 
occupations  and  suppose  we  allow  that  native  and  immigrant  labour  may  no 







  because,  for  example,  of 
employment of immigrant labour in inappropriately low-skilled jobs. Immigrants 
and natives are nonetheless paid equal wages in the same occupation determined 
by  native  productivity.  Immigration  now  generates  a  surplus 
0 0
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∑ ∑  which will, under assumptions of zero 
profits, be returned to native factors. 
Wages paid to immigrants are observed.  The difficulty in estimating the 







.  To the extent that underpayment may be related to downgrading, 
one possible approach would be to compare their wages with those earned by 
natives with similar levels of education and age, say  i w % , as estimated by wage 




w w π − ∑ % . 
The precise size of potential surplus estimated by such an approach depends on 
the precise specification of the native wage regression
30.  Our estimates that allow 
for heteroscedasticity across individuals give a surplus per immigrant equal to 
about 0.137 of the mean native wage.  This is an appreciable fraction, between a 
third and a half, of the positive effect we are seeking to explain.  
 
                                                 
30 We run separate native log-wage regressions by gender and year, and include as regressors five 
age categories  (16/25, 26/35, 36/45, 46/55, 56/65), four educational categories, based on age at 
which individuals left full time education (before 16, 16/18, 19/20, after 20), interactions between 
the  two,  a  dummy  for  London  residents,  and  quarter  dummies.  Based  on  these  estimated 
coefficients, we predict for every immigrant the wage of an identical native individual and take the 
difference between this and the actual wage. We then add up all the differences and express this as 
a share of the total native wage bill. The obtained value is then rescaled by dividing by the ratio of 
immigrants to natives in the population.       32 
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Upon arrival, immigrants may work in jobs or occupations that do not 
correspond  to  their  observed  skill  distribution.  We  demonstrate  that  this 
“downgrading”  is  substantial  for  the  case  of  the  UK,  and  positions  recent 
immigrants at different percentiles of the native wage distribution as to where we 
would  expect  them  based  on  their  observed  skills.  Based  on  a  nested  CES 
framework with a large number of skill groups and capital, we derive an estimator 
that determines the effect of immigration along the distribution of native wages. 
Our approach is flexible, in the way that it does not necessitate pre-allocation of 
immigrants  to  particular  groups,  and  relies  on  estimating  the  impact  of 
immigration for different percentiles of the native wage distribution.  
In our setting, immigration may have differential effects along the native 
wage distribution, with some workers gaining, and others losing. In particular, 
immigration  should  lead  to  wage  pressure  at  those  parts  of  the  native  wage 
distribution where immigrants are relatively more “dense”, and to gains where 
immigrants  are  less  “dense”.  Where  in  the  distribution  of  native  wages 
immigration  leads  to  wage  pressure  is  in  our  view  the  interesting  research 
question. In particular, the estimated effect is a combination of the relative density 
of immigrants at the particular point of the distribution of native wages, which 
determines the sign of the immigration effect at that part in the distribution, and 
structural model parameters. 
The results we obtain are remarkably in line with what we should expect 
given the actual density of immigrants along the distribution of natives, and what 
our  simple  empirical  model  suggests.  We  find  that  immigration  leads  to  a 
decrease in wages at those parts of the distribution where the relative density of 
immigrants is higher than the relative density of natives. On the other hand, it 
leads to a slight increase in native wages at parts of the distribution where the 
opposite is the case. On average over the distribution of natives, we find that 
immigration,  over  the  period  considered,  leads  to  a  slight  increase  in  average 
wages. 
We then investigate possible reasons for the positive average wage effects 
we obtain. We note that even in a simple one industry model, where the only     33 
adjustment mechanism to changes in skill mix are wages, average wages need not 
to decrease if capital supply is sufficiently elastic. Moreover, with elastic capital 
supply and finite immigration, the immigration surplus will be distributed among 
native workers, so that the average wage effect may well be positive. Simulating 
the magnitude of the surplus reveals however that the wage effects we obtain are 
too large to be explained by this surplus. 
We  suggest  two  other  reasons  for  a  migration  surplus.  First,  in  the 
presence of wage stickiness, changes in demand conditions may create a situation 
where  the  wage  received  differs  from  the  marginal  product  of  labour  within 
particular skill groups. If immigrants tend to allocate to labour markets where this 
difference is large, then this may lead to a surplus which may partly go to native 
labour. Secondly, if immigrants downgrade (as we demonstrate in our data), and 
work for wages which are below their marginal productivity, then this may again 
lead  to  a  surplus,  where  native  workers  are  the  beneficiaries.  Our  simulations 
suggest that both explanations may contribute to the overall positive wage effect 
we observe. 
Our analysis adds a number of important insights to the academic debate 
on the impact of immigration. First, we would like to argue that estimates of wage 
effects along the distribution of native wages are useful and important parameters, 
as it clearly reveals the impact immigration has on workers positioned across the 
distribution. These effects may be masked if concentrating on mean effects, or on 
effects  between  skill  groups.  Further,  the  approach  we  suggest  has  the  added 
advantage that it does not require any pre-allocation of immigrants to skill groups. 
Finally, the parameters have a clear-cut interpretation as they translate the relative 
density of immigrants along the native distribution in effect on wages at that part 
of  the  distribution.  As  we  show,  the  correspondence  between  these  two 
independent parts of evidence is remarkable.  
The average effects on wages that we find are positive. We do not believe 
that positive effects are surprising; they should perhaps be expected if we deviate 
from some assumptions that are often made in the literature. First, we note that in 
the  simplest  possible  model,  negative  average  wage  effects  are  only  to  be 
expected  if  capital  is  a  fixed  factor  –  which  may  well  be  a  too  restrictive 
assumption, in particular given the openness of small economies like the UK, and     34 
when accommodating the relatively small inflows of immigrants that are usually 
considered in studies that estimate immigration effects. Secondly, we suggest that 
perhaps labour markets are not in perfect equilibrium when immigration occurs. It 
seems not unreasonable to think that wage stickiness may lead to wages being 
different  from  marginal  productivity  of  particular  skill  groups.  Further,  and 
compatible  with  the  substantial  downgrading  we  observe  for  new  immigrant 
cohorts  in  our  data,  immigrants  may  well  receive  wages  that  are  below  their 
marginal productivity, at least in the first periods after their arrival. This alone 
could lead to quite substantial surpluses which may benefit native wages, as our 
simulations show.      35 
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Appendix A.1: General theory 
 
We  start  with  as  general  a  setting  as  possible.    Suppose  the  economy 
consists of many firms producing many outputs using many inputs.  Specifically, 
suppose the  i
th  firm produces outputs yi using capital inputs ki and labour inputs 
li, where each of these can be a vector of any length, according to technological 
restrictions specifying that the output plan (yi,ki,li) lies in some technology set.  
We assume technology obeys constant returns to scale, outputs are sold at fixed 
world prices p and capital inputs are elastically supplied at world capital prices r.  
Wages are denoted w. 
Individual firms maximise profits taking prices as given so that economy-
wide profit p·y-r·k-w·l is maximised at the given prices where y=Σiyi, k=Σiki and 
l=Σili.    Equilibrium  profits  of  zero  are  assured  by  the  assumption  of  constant 
returns to scale. 
Wages  are  determined  to  equate  aggregate  demand  for  labour  l  to 
aggregate supply. Before immigration aggregate supply is n
0 where n
0 is native 
labour and after immigration it is n=n
0+n
1 where n
1 is immigrant labour.  
Let y
0 and k
0 be the equilibrium outputs and capital inputs and w
0 be the 
equilibrium wages before immigration and let y and k be the equilibrium outputs 
and capital inputs and w be the equilibrium wages after immigration. 
 
By  the  assumption,  given  constant  returns  to  scale,  that  profits  are 






0  ≥  p·y-r·k-w
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0.    (A.2-2) 
 
Hence,  by  subtraction  of  the  rightmost  expression  in  (A.2-2)  from  the 
leftmost expression in (A.2-1) 
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 w·n
0 ≥ 0    (A.2-3) 
 
which is to say the average wage of natives cannot fall.  If wages change at 
all, average native wages must rise.  This is the immigration surplus.  It arises 
because demand curves for labour cannot slope up and immigrants are therefore 
paid no more than the value of their addition to output.  Given that profits are 
zero,  the  resulting  surplus  is  returned  to  existing  factors  and,  given  perfectly 
elastic supply of capital, payments to existing labour must rise.
31   
Furthermore, by subtraction of the leftmost expression in (A.2-2) from the 
rightmost expression in (A.2-1) 
 
 w·n≤ 0.    (A.2-4) 
 
Note  here  that  if  n  is  proportional  to  n
0,  so  that  immigrant  skill 
composition is the same as that in the existing population, then (A.2-3) and (A.2-
4)  can  both  be  true  only  if   w=0  so  there  are  necessarily  no  changes  to 
equilibrium wages (and consequently also no surplus). 
This is not the only case in which wage changes are zero.  If the number of 
output types produced is the same as the number of labour types before and after 
immigration then immigration should also lead to no change in equilibrium wages 
(see Leamer and Levinsohn 1995). 
 
Further, by subtraction of (A.2-3) from (A.2-4) , 
 
 w·n
1≤ 0    (A.2-5) 
 
Hence, given n
1>0, if wages do change then equilibrium wages must fall 
for some types.   The inequality in (A.2-5) shows the sense in which these falls 
must tend to be greater where immigration is most intense. 
                                                 
31 If capital is less than perfectly elastically supplied then some of the surplus may go to 
capital and it can be said only that existing inputs as a whole gain. 
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Equilibrium values of wages wi and return to capital ρ are given by the 
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First order effect of immigration on the wage distribution 
Differentiating these expressions gives 
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= , where θ is the elasticity of supply of capital, we 
can substitute into the expression for 
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    Notice  that  φ =1  if  there  is  perfectly 
elastic supply of capital (θ=∞), perfect substitutability of capital and labour (s=1) 
or capital share is zero (ψ=1). 
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First order effect of immigration on the mean native wage 
From (A.1-2), at m=0, 
0 0 w w i i i ω π =  where 
0 w  denotes the mean wage at 
m=0.    Hence  the  first  order  effect  of  immigration  on  mean  wages  in  the 
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This is nonpositive since σ≤1 and φ ≤1 and equals zero iff φ =1 or σ=1. 
 
First order effect of immigration on the wage of competing labour 
The first order effect on mean wages of a population composed similarly 
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In  this  case  nonpositivity  follows  from  the  Cauchy-Schwarz  inequality, 
given φ ≤1, since 
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0,
i i i i
i i i i
i i i i
π π π π
ω φ ω ω ω
π π π π
       
− ≥ − ≥        
        ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
and the first order effect is zero iff either φ =1 and 
0 1
i i π π =  for all i or σ=1. 
Second order effect of immigration on the mean native wage 
In the special case that φ =1 it is necessary to turn to second order terms in 
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Substituting  into  (A.1-6),  summing  and  simplifying  for  the  case  m=0, 
gives 



















































































    (A.1-7)     44 
which  is  positive  provided  the  skill  composition  of  immigrants  differs 
from  the  pre-existing  population,  again  by  the  Cauchy-Schwarz  inequality.  
Furthermore  the  size  of  the  second  order  effect  on  mean  wages  is  evidently 
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Source: LFS, various years
Position of recent immigrants in wage distribution
 
The figure shows kernel estimates of the density of immigrants who arrived within the last two 
(dashed line) or six (dotted line) years in the non-immigrant wage distribution. The horizontal line 
shows as a reference the non-immigrant wage distribution The kernel estimates are above the 
horizontal line at wages where immigrants are more concentrated than natives, and below the 
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Percentile of non-immigrant wage distribution
Less than 2 years Less than 6 years
Non-immigrant
Source: LFS, various years
Predicted position of recent immigrants in wage distribution
 
The figure shows kernel estimates of the predicted density of immigrants who arrived within the 
last  two  (dashed  line)  or  six  (dotted  line)  years  in  the  non-immigrant  wage  distribution.  The 
horizontal line shows as a reference the non-immigrant wage distribution The kernel estimates are 
above the horizontal line at wages where immigrants are more concentrated than natives, and 
below the horizontal line at wages where immigrants are less concentrated than natives. See text 
for details about wage prediction. 
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Impact of immigration across the wage distribution
 
The figure reports the estimated IV regression coefficients and the 95% confidence interval from a 
difference regression of each wage percentile from the 5
th to the 95
th percentile in intervals of 5 
percentage points on the ratio of immigrants to natives for years 1997/2005 and time dummies 






Table 1 – Average age, gender ratio, and education  in  1997 and 2005 
Foreign Born    Natives 
Earlier  Recent 
  1997  2005  1997  2005  1997  2005 
Age  39.32  40.26  40.44  39.88  28.72  29.09 
% Female  50.32  50.64  53.22  52.46  56.42  49.83 
Education:             
% High  11.90  16.49  26.00  34.68  49.08  45.60 
% Intermediate  23.64  26.76  33.57  34.31  39.91  41.22 
% Low  64.46  56.75  40.43  31.01  11.01  13.18 
Entries are the average age, the percentage of female, and the share of working age (16-65) natives and 
immigrants of both sexes in each education group in1997 and 2005. 
High education: left full time education at age 21 or later 
Intermediate education: left full time education between age 17 and 20 (included) 
Low education: left full time education not after age 16, or never had full time education 







Table 2  – Occupational distribution in 2004 and 2005 
  Foreign Born 
 
Natives 
Earlier  Recent 
Average 
wage 
Higher managerial and professional  15.06  21.92  16.99  18.92 
Lower managerial and professional  31.45  31.17  20.79  12.99 
Intermediate occupations  14.02  10.97  8.79  8.60 
Lower supervisory and technical  12.40  9.39  6.59  8.51 
Semi-routine occupations  15.88  15.77  21.95  6.62 
Routine occupations  11.19  10.78  24.89  6.74 
Entries are the share of working age (16-65) natives and immigrants of both sexes in each occupation group 
in years 2004-2005 pooled. 
Average wage is the average wage in the occupation in 2004-2005, expressed in 2005 terms. 






    
Table 3 - Occupation by level of education in 2004 and 2005 
High education  Intermediate education  Low education 
Foreign Born  Foreign Born  Foreign Born   
Natives 
Earlier  Recent 
Natives 
Earlier  Recent 
Natives 
Earlier  Recent 
Higher managerial and 
professional 
36.87  39.63  29.71  15.2  12.59  4.62  7.04  5.75  3.62 
Lower managerial and 
professional 
46.84  36.29  29.81  37.41  33.38  13.52  22.7  19.47  6.19 
Intermediate 
occupations 
8.51  8.61  9.45  18.56  14.5  9.77  13.61  9.78  1.92 
Lower supervisory and 
technical 
2.75  4.43  4.86  9.31  10.08  8.65  17.64  16.74  8.6 
Semi-routine 
occupations 
3.83  7.32  14.37  13.4  18.49  29.47  21.47  26.07  29.79 
Routine occupations  1.2  3.72  11.79  6.13  10.95  33.97  17.54  22.19  49.88 
Entries are the share of working age (16-65) natives and immigrants of both sexes in each occupation group by level of 
education  in 2004-2005 pooled. 
Source: LFS  2004, 2005 
    
Table 4 – Test for serial correlation in wage variables 
Dependent Variable  M1  M2 



















































The table reports Arellano-Bond tests for first (M1) and second (M2) order serial correlation 
based on residuals from the first differenced equation with all control variables, estimated 
using the 4





    
 
 
Table  5    –  Effect  of  immigration  on  wage  distribution–  impact  on  different  wage 
percentiles 
OLS  IV 
[1991 Immigration Share] 
IV 
[4 period lag] 
First Differences  First Differences  First Differences 
Dependent 
Variable 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
5



























































































IV in first stage 
regression 









2 for first stage 
regression      0.352  0.382  0.350  0.377 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other Controls  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  136  136  136  136  136  136 
Entries are the estimated regression coefficients of the ratio of immigrants to natives in regressions of 
different  natives’ wage percentiles on the ratio of immigrants to natives for years 1997-2005.  
“Other  Controls”  include  average  natives’  and  immigrants’  age,  and  the  logarithm  of  the  ratio  of 
natives in each education group to natives with no qualifications. 









    
 
Table 6  – Effect of immigration on average wages 
OLS  IV 
[1991 Immigration Share] 
IV 
[4 period lag] 
First Differences  First Differences  First Differences 
Dependent 
Variable 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 



















































IV in first stage 
regression 









2 for first stage 
regression      0.352  0.382  0.350  0.377 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other Controls  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  136  136  136  136  136  136 
Entries are the estimated regression coefficients of the ratio of immigrants to natives in regressions of 
different measures of natives’ average wages on the ratio of immigrants to natives for years 1997-2005.  
Robust  average  wages  are  computed  by  trimming  the  wage  distribution  at  the  (region-  and  year- 
specific) top and bottom percentile .The wage index is the weighted log sum of the average wage of each 
education  group,  using  time  invariant  weights.  Its  robust  version  uses  the  trimmed  distribution  to 
compute education-specific averages. 
“Other  Controls”  include  average  natives’  and  immigrants’  age,  and  the  logarithm  of  the  ratio  of 
natives in each education group to natives with no qualifications. 










    
 
  
Table 7 -  Simulated mean wage effects 
Ability distribution of immigrants 
















m=0.01  m=0.1  m=0.01  m=0.1 
∞  ∞,2,1  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
2  ∞,2,1  0.000  0.002  0.002  0.201  ∞ 
1  ∞,2,1  0.000  0.005  0.005  0.397 
∞  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
2  -0.239    -2.240  -0.188   -1.788  ∞ 
1  -0.321    -3.044  -0.252    -2.422 
∞  0.000  0.002  0.002  0.201 
2  -0.239    -2.237  -0.185  -1.539  2 
1  -0.321    -3.041  -0.248  -2.156 
∞  0.000  0.005  0.005  0.396 
2  -0.239    -2.234  -0.182  -1.297 
1 
1 
1  -0.321    -3.038  -0.245  -1.896 
∞  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
2  -0.299    -2.775  -0.234  -2.219  ∞ 
1  -0.480    -4.496  -0.377  -3.589 
∞  0.000  0.002  0.002  0.201 
2  -0.299    -2.772  -0.231  -1.959  2 
1  -0.480    -4.492  -0.373  -3.292 
∞  0.000  0.005  0.005  0.396 
2  -0.299    -2.768  -0.228  -1.706 
0 
1 
1  -0.480    -4.489  -0.370  -3.002 
Entries  are  the  simulated  percentage  changes  in  mean  native  wage  following  an  inflow  of 
immigrants of magnitude m*native population under different assumptions on the elasticity of 
capital supply, the elasticity of substitution between labour types and between capital and labour, 
and the ability distribution of migrants. “Observed” distribution is the distribution estimated in 
figure 1; “Extreme” distribution assumes all immigrants are evenly spread in the lower half of the 














    
 




Average  Instrumental variable 
(1)  (2) 
4





































Entries are the estimated IV regression coefficients of the ratio of immigrants to natives in regressions 
of log average regional wages and robust log average regional wages on the ratio of immigrants to 
natives for years 1997-2005. The instrumental variable used is described in the first column. 
Robust  average  wages  are  computed  by  trimming  the  wage  distribution  at  the  (region-  and  year- 
specific) top and bottom percentile. 






















    
Table A2 – Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
   
Log-wages, all natives   
Average hourly pay  2.199  0.133 
Robust average hourly pay  2.173  0.132 
Wage index  3.315  0.143 
Robust wage index  3.315  0.143 
Average hourly pay, men  2.314  0.131 
Average hourly pay, women  2.061  0.142 
Robust average hourly pay, men  2.280  0.128 
Robust average hourly pay, women  2.047  0.142 
   
Log-wages, natives by education group   
Average hourly pay, high  2.637  0.103 
Average hourly pay, intermediate  2.247  0.116 
Average hourly pay, low  2.062  0.105 
Robust average hourly pay, high  2.573  0.103 
Robust average hourly pay, intermediate  2.221  0.117 
Robust average hourly pay, low  2.054  0.106 
   
Log-wages, earlier  immigrants   
Average hourly pay  2.257  0.146 
Robust average hourly pay  2.202  0.147 
   
Natives’ log- wage percentiles   
5
th  1.266  0.148 
10
th  1.433  0.129 
25
th  1.678  0.131 
50
th  2.022  0.132 
75
th  2.413  0.134 
90
th  2.763  0.139 
95
th  2.970  0.152 
   
Immigrant-native ratio  0.088  0.110 
Annual change in immigrant-native ratio  0.004  0.008 
Average natives’ age  39.881  0.890 
Average immigrants’ age  38.895  1.961 
ln high educ./low educ.  -1.639  0.388 
ln intermed. educ./low educ.  -1.032  0.283 
Entries are the mean value and the standard deviation of the variables used in the analysis, across 
all regions and years 1997-2005. 
Wages are expressed in 2005 pounds, using the 2005 CPI index. 





    
Table A3 – Descriptive statistics on immigrants’ inflow 
Years  Mean  Std.Dev  Min  Max 
1997-1998  0.23%  0.78%  -1.28%  2.59% 
1998-1999  -0.02%  0.56%  -1.25%  0.83% 
1999-2000  0.22%  1.14%  -0.69%  4.46% 
2000-2001  0.41%  0.63%  -0.48%  2.05% 
2001-2002  0.43%  0.86%  -0.53%  3.01% 
2002-2003  0.29%  0.45%  -0.42%  1.55% 
2003-2004  0.50%  0.82%  -0.80%  2.95% 
2004-2005  0.77%  0.59%  -0.43%  1.77% 
Average 1997/2005  0.35%       
1997-2005  2.83%  3.50%  -0.27%  15.83% 
Entries are the annual mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum across all regions of the 
change in immigrant-native ratio for years 1997-2005. 
 The last row reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum across all regions of the 
1997/2005 change in immigrants-natives  ratio. 
Source: LFS, 1997-2005 
 
 
 
 